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BANKS AND BANKING-CHECKS-DISCHARGE OF DRAWER-DE-
POSIT IN DRAWEE BANK-Defendant drew a check to order of the
plaintiff who deposited it to his account in the same bank. The de-
posit was entered in plaintiff's passbook, and accounts were accord-
ingly debited and credited. The drawee was then known to its officers
to be hopelessly insolvent and was closed by the bank examiner a few
hours later. Held: the check was paid and the drawer discharged.'
The particular set of facts involved, appears never to have been
passed upon before,2 due probably to an inherent feeling of payee de-
positors that since they have requested and received the credit of their
own bank, they have no equitable recourse upon another unfortunate
depositor. Generally the action brought, is one against the insolvent's
receivers to declare a preference.3
The inquiry here is, has the check been paid. As the court points
out, the question must be distinguished from that arising where a
holder deposits checks drawn upon another bank for collection; and
the problem cannot be decided under the principle there governing,
that where a bank, known to its officers to be hopelessly insolvent, ac-
cepts checks from its depositor for collection, the depositor may
rescind the transaction and recover his paper.4 Even in those cases
if the check has been paid by the drawee, the drawer is held to be dis-
charged.
'Boatwright v. Rankin 148 S. E. 214 (S. C. 1929).
But cf. Hare v. Bailey, 73 Minn. 409, 76 N. W. 213 (1898) ; Board of Edu-
cation v. Robinson, 81 Minn. 305, 84 N. W. 105, 83 Am. St. Rep. 374 (1900) ;
Parks v. Bryant, 142 Ala. 627, 38 So. 180 (1905); Montgomery .County v.
Cochran, 121 Fed. 17 (C. C. A. 5th, 1903), cases of counter presentment for
credit in which the drawer was held discharged, but distinguishable on their
facts as e.g., (1) suit against surety on the bonds of county officials, (2) no
finding of hopeless and irretrievable insolvency, (3) payee had at the time of
bank's failure, withdrawn part of the deposit. And see Herman v. Cohen, 218
Ala. 491, 119 So. 1 (1928) intimating that had the bank been hopelessly in-
solvent, the result might have been different.
'Raynor v. Scandinavian-American Bank, 122 Wash. 150, 210 Pac. 499, 25
A. L. R. 716 (1922) and note; Steele v. Allen, 240 Mass. 394, 134 N. E. 401,
20 A. L. R 1203 (1922); Pennington v. Third Nat. Bank, 114 Va. 674, 77
S. E. 455, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 781 (1913), on the grounds that the fraud en-
titled deositor to rescind, or that a trust maleficio is created entitling depos-
itor to a preference.
'Old Nat. Bank v. Gibson, 105 Wash. 578, 179 Pac. 117, 6 A. L. R. 247
(1919) ; Raynor v. Scandinavian-American Bank, mspra note 3; Knaffl v. Knox-
ville Banking Co., 130 Tenn. 336, 170 S. W. 476, L. R. A. 1915D 402, that a
bank receiving checks for collection knowing of its insolvency can acquire no
title to them. This fact is immaterial in determining whether the check has
been paid so as to discharge the drawer.
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Where the payee could have demanded cash but instead agreed to
accept payment in some other medium, the drawer is discharged.5
But the important question is, could he have gotten cash? It has
been decided in North Carolina that where a drawee receiving checks
by mail for collection remits an exchange draft and charges accounts
accordingly, the check is not paid if the drawee did not have sufficient
funds in its own vaults or with its correspondents to pay the check.6
An insolvent drawee may not deal with the rights of the parties to a
check so as to substitute its own liability for that of the drawer when
it knows that a credit by it is worthless.7 In the instant case the
examiner dosed the bank a few hours after the deposit but whether
at the bank's request or the examiner's own initiative, does not appear.
The trend of the law governing checks and bank collections is
in the direction of giving adequate protection to payees in most cases,
either by continuing the drawer's liability or allowing a preference in
the insolvent's assets.8 It is submitted that the fact that the payee
here was also a depositor of the drawee should not alter the policy.9
HARRY ROCKwELL,
'Smith Roofing Co. v. Mitchell, 121 Ga. 772, 45 S. E. 47 (1903) ; Morris v.
Cleve, 197 N. C. 253, 148 S. E. 256 (1929) noted in 8 N. C. L. REv. 55; 2
MoRSE, BANKS AND BANKING (6th ed.) §451.
'Moore & Dawson v. Highway Eng. & Const. Co., 196 N. C. 142, 144 S. E.
692 (1928) commented on in 7 N. C. L. REv. 187; and see Waggoner Bank &
Trust Co. v. Gamer Co. 213 S. W. 927, 6 A. L. R. 613 (Tex. 1919) ; Taylor v.
Wilson, 11 Met. (Mass.) 44, 45 Am. Dec. 180 (1846), holding that a bank
must be solvent for a check to operate as payment. See also, Exch. Bank of
Wheeling v. Sutton, 78 Md. 577, 28 Atl. 563 (1894), where a check sent by
mail to drawee was debited to drawer a short time before suspension, and the
receiver later credited it to the payee. And it has been held, where it was negli-
gence to accept a draft in payment of a check sent for collection and the
drawee did not have sufficient funds to pay, if cash had been demanded, that
the forwarding bank was not liable for accepting the draft which was dis-
honored. Louisville & N. Ry. Co. v. Fed. Res. Bank, 157 Tenn. 497, 10 S. W.
(2d) 683 (1928).
'Supra, note 6.
'See comment on Central Trust Co. v. Mullens, 150 S. E. 137 (W. Va. 1929)
in this issue, infra p. 201.
' The American Bankers Association "Bank Collection Code" §3 provides in
effect that a credit given by a bank for items drawn on the same bank shall be
provisional, subject to revocation at or before the end of the day in the event
that it is found not payable. See (1929) 46 Banking Law Journal 755, (New
York Act, §350-b). It has previously been so held in some states, Cohen v.
First Nat. Bank, 22 Ariz. 394, 198 Pac. 122, 15 A. L. R. 701 (1921) ; Stankey v.
Citizen's Nat. Bank, 64 Mont. 309, 209 Pac. 1054 (1922) ; Ocean Park Bank v.
Rogers, 6 Cal. App. 673, 92 Pac. 879 (1907). And the majority of banks in
this country carry stipulations to that effect on their deposit slips. The effect
of such practice is to make counter presentment for credit, actually equivalent
to presentment for collection from and by the drawee itself. The drawee in
such case has a double identity; both as a depositary receiving checks for col-
lection, and- as a drawee holding checks as agent of the payee to present to
itself and collect, and the situation becomes much the same as that where the
depositary and the drawee are separate banks. The general rule, therefore,
that a credit given for a check drawn on the same bank is tantamount to a
cash payment and redeposit, is not entirely applicable.
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BANKS AN) BANKING-ILLEGAL DEPOSIT OF PUBLIC FUNDS-
RIGHTS OF DEPOSITORS UPON INSOLVENCY OF BANK-In a recent
Georgia case,1 a town treasurer deposited in a bank, of which he was
also cashier, certain sinking funds of the town. The deposit was in
violation of a statute requiring investments in bonds. Shortly there-
after the bank became insolvent, and the' receiver paid out three 10%
dividends, a part of which was raised by assessing the stockholders on
their statutory liability, to the plaintiff town along with the general
depositors. The town then brought a bill in equity to enjoin further
payments to the general creditors until its claim should be paid in
full. Held: that while the bank was affected with notice of the ille-
gal nature of the deposit so that a trust relationship might arise, en-
titling the town to restitution from any assets of the bank into which
the funds could be traced, the injunction was denied, because the town
had not returned the dividends received as a general creditor.
In the absence of express statutory regulation, a deposit of public
funds in a bank gives rise to a debtor-creditor relationship.2 The
same result obtains where the deposit is expressly authorized.3 But
it has been widely held that an illegal or wrongful deposit of public
funds creates a trust relationship. 4 Most jurisdictions therefore re-
quire that the funds deposited be clearly traced into the assets of the
bank taken over by the receiver.5 Some courts, however, dispense
'Town of Douglasville v. Mobley, 149 S. E. 575 (Ga., 1929).
'City of Sturgis v. Meade County Bank, 38 S. D. 317, 161 N. W. 327 (1917);
Kies v. Wilkinson, 101 Wash. 340, 172 Pac. 351 (1918); cf. Zizelman v. Union
Trust Co., 25 Ohio App. 165, 157 N. E. 903 (1927) and Note (1927) 1 Univ. of
Cincinnati L. Rev. 495.
'Town of Conway v. Conway, 190 Iowa 563, 180 N. W. 677 (1920).
'First Nat. Bank v. C. Bunting & Co., 7 Idaho 27, 59 Pac. 929 (1900);
Page County v. Rose, 130 Iowa 296, 106 N. W. 744 (1906) and Note (1907) 5
L. R. A. (N.S.) 886; Poweshiek County v. Merchants Nat. Bank of Grinnell,
220 N. W. 63 (Iowa 1928); Leach v. Grinnell Sav. Bank, 219 N. W.
483 (Iowa 1928); Special Road Dist. v. Cantley, 8 S. W. (2d) 944 (Mo.
App. 1928); Jarvis v. Hammons, 259 Pac. 886 (Ariz. 1927); City of New
Hampton v. Leach, 201 Iowa 316, 207 N. W. 348 (1926) ; Grand Forks County
v. Baird, 54 N. D. 315, 209 N. W. 782 (1926) ; Leach v. Farmers Say. Bank
of Hamburg, 204 Iowa 1083, 216 N. W. 748 (1927) and Note (1928) 76 U. Pa.
L. RFv. 864; Phillips v. Yates Center Nat. Bank, 98 Kan. 383, 158 Pac. 23
(1916) and Note L. R. A. 1917A, 683.
'Board of Fire and Water Com'rs of City of Marquette v. Wilkinson, 119
Mich. 655, 78 N. W. 893, 44 L. R. A. 493 (1899) ; In re Linn County Bank, I
S. W. (2d) 206 (Mo. App. 1928) ; Special Road Dist. v. Cathey, supra note 4;
Jarvis v. Hammons, supra note 4; City of New Hampton v. Leach, supra note
4; Honer v. Hanover State Bank, 114 Kan. 123, 216 Pac. 822 (1923) ; Chetopah
State Bank v. Farmers' & Merchants' State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 218 Pac. 1000
(1923) ; U. S. Nat. Bank of Centralia v. Centralia, 243 U. S. 656, 61 L. ed. 949
(Wash. 1917); City of Spring Hill v. Paxton, 115 Kan. 412, 223 Pac. 283
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with the necessity of tracing by holding that the state has a common-
law prerogative of preference in the assets of insolvent debtors.0 On
the other hand, an agreement whereby the state was to receive interest
on the deposit has been held to amount to a waiver, upon the part of
the state, of this right.7 But the courts are divided as to whether this
prerogative preference extends to political subdivisions of the state,
such as counties.8 A Mississippi statute gives the right to munici-
palities.9 The North Carolina court has denied the existence of any
such governmental prerogative, however, as being opposed to the
principles of democratic institutions.1 0
The dicta in the principal case are supported by the weight of
authority. The result of the decision, however, is opposed by a North
Dakota case1 1 holding that a county could impress a trust upon the
assets of the insolvent bank although it had already received dividends
(1924); Board of Com'rs of Dona Ana County v. Clapp, 24 N. M. 522, 174
Pac. 998 (1918). Contra: State v. McKee, 168 Ark. 441, 270 S. W. 513 (1925).
See Note L. R. A. 1916C, 21.
"Fidelity and D. Co. v. State Bank, 117 Ore. 1, 242 Pac. 823 (1926);,Re
Carnegie Trust Co., 206 N. Y. 390, 99 N. E. 1096 (1912); State v. Banking
Corp. of Montana, 77 Mont. 134, 251 Pac. 151 (1926) ; Fidelity and Guaranty
Co. v. Bramwell, 108 Ore. 261, 217 Pac. 332 (1923) and Note (1924) 32 A. L. R.
829; Aetna Accident and Liability Co. v. Miller, 54 Mont. 377, 170 Pac. 760,
L. R. A. 1918C, 954 (1918) ; American Surety Co. of New York v. Pearson, 146
Minn. 341, 178 N. W. 817 (1920); Note (1913) 46 L. R. A. (N.S.) 260.
Contra: Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Union Say. Bank Co., 29 Ohio
App. 154, 163 N. E. 221 (1928); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Rainwater, 291
S. W. 1003 (Ark. 1927); Hammons v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 30
Ariz. 480, 248 Pac. 1086 (1926); Phillips v. Yates Center Nat. Bank, .supra
note 4. See Note (1908) 8 Ann. Cas. 116, and (1907) 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 886.
As pointed out by the Iowa court in Poweshiek County v. Merchants Nat.
Bank of Grinnell, =pra note 4, "A preference can only arise by reason of some
statutory provision or some fixed principle of common law which creates a
special, superior right in certain creditors over others." The distinction be-
tween a preferred claim and a priority by reason of a trust is important be-
cause in the latter case the trust res must be traced into the assets of the in-
solvent debtor-trustee.
'National Surety Co. v. Morris, 34 Wyo. 134, 241 Pac. 1063, 42 A. L. R. 1290
(1925); see also Board of Education v. Union Trust Co., 136 Mich. 454, 99
N. W. 373 (1904). Contra: Maryland Casualty Co. v. McConnell, 148 Tenn.
656, 257 S. W. 410 (1924) ; Central Bank and Trust Corp. v. State, 139 Ga.
54, 76 S. E. 587 (1912) ; Fidelity and D. Co. v. State Bank, supra note 6.
8Affirmative: Leach v. U. S. Bank of Des Moines, 205 Iowa 987, 213 N. W.
528 (1927). See also Pinal County v. Hammons, 30 Ariz. 36. 243 Pac. 919
(1926). Contra: Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Bramwell, 12 F. (2d)
307 (D. C. Ore. 1926).
"Miss. Code 1906, §3485 (,Hemingway's Code 1927, §3019).
"Corp. Comm. v. Citizen's Bank and Trust Co., 193. N C. 513, 137 S. E.
587 (1927). Accord: In re Northern Bank of New York, 212 N. Y. 608,
106 N. E. 749 (1914) ; In re Central Bank of Willcox, 23 Ariz. 574, 205 Pac.
915 (1922).'Grand Forks County v. Baird, supra note 4.
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
as a general creditor, the relief being measured by the amount of cash
on hand at the time of closing, which, added to the dividend, was still
less than the total amount of the county's deposit. It is submitted that
the outcome of the principal case would have been fairer if a similar
result had been reached, or if a conditional decree had been entered,
requiring a tender into court of the dividend received as a condition
precedent to relief.
PEYTON B. ABBOTT.
BILLS AND NOTES-BANKS AND BANKING-CHECK AS AN AS-
SIGNENT-Where a check drawn by A upon X Bank payable to B
is dishonored because of A's intervening insolvency, and X subse-
quently applies the amount standing to A's credit in discharge of a
debt owing to it, does B have a preference to the amount of the check
in A's general assets? The West Virginia court answered in the af-
firmative on the ground that the check constituted an equitable assign-
ment of the fund pro tanto.1
While many courts, prior to the enactment of the N. I. L. held
a check to be a pro tanto assignment of the fund drawn against, the
majority did not.2 The hardship thrownupon a drawee bank by such
holdings, arising from its liability to payees after payment to exec-
utors, administrators, attaching creditors, other check holders, or its
refusal to pay after countermand by the drawer, was removed by
N. I. L. § 189.3 Many of the minority states still continue to hold that
'Central Trust Co. v. Bank of Mullens, 150 S. E. 137 (W. Va. 1929).
A check operates as an equitable assignment pro tanto: Hulings v. Hulings
Lumber Co., 38 W. Va. 351, 18 S. E. 620 (1893) ; Kuhnes v. Cahill, 128 Iowa
594, 104 N. W. 1025 (1905); Wasgatt v. First Nat. Bank, 117 Minn. 9, 134
N. W. 224, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 109 (1912) ; Boswell v. Citizens' Saving Bank,
123 Ky. 485, 96 S. W. 797 (1906) ; Peoples Nat. Bank v. Swift, 134 Tenn. 175,
183 S. W. 125 (1916) ; Southern Cabinet Co v. First Nat. Bank, 87 S. C. 79,
68 S. E. 962, 29 L. R. A. 623 (1910). Contra: N. C. Corp Comm. v. Mer-
chants' & Farmers' Bank, 137 N. C. 697, 50 S. E. 308, 2 Ann. Cas. 537 (1905);
Peter's Shoe Co. v. Murray, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 259, 71 S. W. 977 (1903);
Grammill v. Carmer, 55 Mich. 201, 21 N. W. 418, 54 Am. Rep. 363 (1884).
Mr. Morse strongly favors the assignment theory and seems to suggest that
N. I. L. §§127 and 189 are undesirable, 2 MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING (6th
ed.), §§494-510; while Mr. Brannan takes the contrary view, BRANNAN, NE-
GOTIABLE INsTRUmENTS LAW (4th ed.), 902 et seq.
' "A check of itself does not operate as an assignment of any part of the
funds to the credit of the drawer with the bank, and the bank is not liable unless
and until it accepts or certifies the check." However it is still possible for a
drawer to make an assignment of all or part of his account, but it must be
so shown by evidence of intention to assign, other than the check itself. Fourth
St. Nat. Bank v. Yardley, 165 U. S. 634, 17 S. Ct. 439, 41 L. ed. 855 (1897) ;
Peoples Nat. Bank v. Swift, 134 Tenn. 175, 183 S. W. 725 (1916) ; see Aigler,
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as between the drawer, or those standing in his place, and the payee
or holder, a check operates as an equitable assignment pro tanto of
the fund drawn upon from the time of delivery.4 The results reached
in various situations, from logical deductions based upon the law of
assignment in general have however not been uniform.5
In the instant case admitting that the check operates as an as-
signment, it is difficult to see how it can be made the basis of a pref-
erence in the insolvent's general assets. Being an assignment, any
rights in the payee would attach to the thing assigned and if the de-
posit in the drawee had been paid to the drawer's receivers, the payee's
rights would not be extinguished.6 But here the receivers did nothing
in regard to the chose in action owing to them. The drawee merely
appropriated the amount of the deposit to the drawer's credit to the
satisfaction of a debt owing to it. Under N. I. L. §189 the drawee is
apparently not liable since it refused to accept the check. 7 True, the
Rights of Holder of Bill of Exchange Against the Drawee (1925), 38 HAIM. L.
REv. 860; Feezer, Death of a Drawer of a Check (1930), 14 MINN. L. REV.
124.
'Fed. Res. Bank v. Peters, 139 Va. 45, 123 S. E. 379, 42 A. L. R. 742 (1924);
McClain & Norvet v. Torkelson, 187 Iowa 202, 174 N. W. 42, 5 A. L. R. 1665
(1919), but overruled in Leach v. Mechanic's Savings Bank, 202 Iowa 899, 211
N. W. 506 50 A. L. R. 388 (1926) and note. Contra; Anderson v. Elem,
111 Kan. 713, 208 Pac. 573, 23 A. L. R. 1202 (1922) ; Kaesemeyer v. Smith, 22
Ida. 1, 123 Pac. 943, 43 L. R. A. 100 (1912), even though deposit was made
for the purpose of paying the check. See cases collected in BRANNAN, NECo-
VABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (4th ed.), 902 et seq.; Perry v. Bank of Smithfield,
131 N. C. 117, 42 S. E. 551 (1902); semble, Standard Trust Co. v. Comm. Nat.
Bank, 166 N. C. 112, 81 S. E. 1074 (1914).
'Supra note 4.
The atmosphere might possibly be clarified if the term "assignment of
the debt owing to the drawer" were used rather than "assignment of the fund
drawn upon." Certainly there is no actual fund to which the assignment
might attach, nor even a transfer of a chose in action, since it is unenforceable
against the debtor. Since delivery of the check gives rise to none of the ordi-
nary legal consequences and relations flowing from an actual assignment, it
might be well to adopt another name for the method by which the desired re-
sults are reached. See BIGELOW, BILLS AND NoTEs (3rd ed.), §§208-214.
'But upon the premise that the check here is an equitable assignment,
should not the drawee bank be liable? It is submitted that the drawee is not
protected by N. I. L. §189 in this case. Suit might have been brought against
it, not for failure to honor the check-since a bank is justified and even required
to refuse to honor the drawer's checks upon notice of his insolvency, espe-
cially when the drawer is a bank, First Nat. Bank v. Selden, 120 Fed. 212
(C. C. A. 7th, 1903)-but for the appropriation to its own use of the debt with
knowledge of the assignment. The position of the drawee here is that of at-
taching creditor, or purchaser with notice and not of dishonoring drawee. Pos-
sibly the right of set-off attaching upon the drawer's insolvency might prove a
greater equity than that of the payee's, but apart from this there seems to be
a good cause of action against the drawee.
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receiver gets the benefit of the set-off, but that fact may be taken ad-
vantage of only under some other theory of preference.8
The effect of the present holding is to make a check a preferred
claim against the drawer's general assets without regard to the fund
drawn against. It would logically follow that if A having $500 on
deposit gives a check to B and later one to C for that amount, and C
cashes his check first, B would be entitled to a preference over A's
creditors. HARRY ROCKWELL.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-MARRIAGE AND DivocE-In a recent case,
it was found that the plaintiff, who claimed the proceeds of a War-
Risk Insurance Policy, had married the now deceased ex-soldier in
Minnesota within one year after receiving her divorce from a former
husband in Wisconsin. This act was an intentional evasion of the
Wisconsin statutes,2 which provided that a marriage contracted with-
in one year after the divorce decree would be void, whether within
or without the state. It was held that the marriage was invalid and
that the proceeds of the policy should go to the next of kin.
It is well established that a bona fide marriage which is valid
in the place of celebration is valid everywhere,8 unless entered into
for the purpose of evading the laws of the jurisdiction in which the
parties reside,4 or unless it is an incestuous or polygamous mar-
riage.5
'In the instant case the decision was also based upon the theory that the
drawer, who was by this check transmitting the proceeds of a collection held the
debt "collected" by it in trust for the plaintiff. For a discussion of the trust
fund theory see, Goodyear Co. v. Hanover State Bank, 109 Kan. 772, 204 Pac.
992. 21 A. L. R. 677 and note (1921) ; Fed. Res. Bank v. Peters, supra note 4.
The same result is reached in this state by a statute giving a preference, N. C.
CODE (Michie 1927), §218(c), subs. 14.
'Such a situation is unusual, the normal one being a contest between two
or more parties for title to a single specific sum of money, and it seems unlikely
that the West Virginia court would grant B a preference.'Cummings v. United States, 34 F. (2d) 284 (D. C. Minn. 1929).
Wis. Stat. (Edition 1925) §245.03 ss.2 and §245.04.
'State v. Ross, 76 N. C. 242 (1877); Pierce v. Pierce, 58 Wash. 622,
109 Pac. 45 (1910) ; In re Wood, 137 Cal. 129, 69 Pac. 900 (1902) ; Lanham
v. Lanham, 136 Wis. 360, 117 N. W. 787 (1908); cf. Fowler v. Fowler, 131
N. C. 169, 42 S. E. 563 (2) (1902); Fisher v. Fisher, 250 N. Y. 313, 165 N. E.
460 (1929), where marriage on the sea was held valid, since a ship on the high
seas is considered domiciled where its owner resides rather than at the port
from which it sailed. See State v. Ta-Cha-Na-Tah, 64 N. C. 614 (1870) which
held a common law marriage between Indians was invalid in this state though
in accord with their custom. Note (1909) 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 800.
'State v. Kennedy, 76 N. C. 251 (1877) ; Lanham v. Lanham, supra note 3;
Johnson v. Johnson, 57 Wash. 89, 106 Pac. 500 (1910) ; White v. White, 167
Wis. 615, 168 N. W. 704 (1918) ; In re Kienstra, 276 Pac. 294 (Wash. 1929) ;
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
A state has the power to legislate as to marriages contracted by
its citizens in other jurisdictions, so as to invalidate a marriage
which might be valid under the foreign law.6 However, if the
marriage is technically void but one of the parties acted in good
faith, it has been held not to be illegal.
7
Generally a state adopts its marriage and divorce policy irrespec-
tive of the laws of another state, but it has been held, under what
seems to be the better reasoning, that a state will give effect to the
policy of marriage and divorce laws of other jurisdictions which is
similar to its own.8 However, this rule has no application when the
parties do not return to their former domicile, for such statutes
have no extraterritorial effect.9  For instance, suppose statutes
similar to the one in the instant case to be in force in States X and
Y but not in State Z. A person having been divorced in X marries
in Z. If the parties return to X, the marriage is invalid in that state
and in Y, their policies being mutual, but if the parties remove di-
rectly to Y, their status when questioned there is determined by the
laws of Z. Suppose, however, the marriage is contracted in Y. By
the better view such marriage is invalid in y.1o And if the parties
then removed to Z from Y, it should follow that the marriage would
be held invalid there, but such marriage might conceivably be held
valid in Z unless the status of the particular parties had been deter-
mined in Y.
State v. Fenn, 47 Wash. 561, 92 Pac. 417 (1907). Contra: Van Voorhis v.
Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18, 40 Am. Rep. 505 (1881); Dudley v. Dudley, 161
Iowa 142, 130 N. W. 785 (1911); Palmer v. Palmer, 163 N. E. 879 (Mass,
1928); (1929) 42 HAv. L. Rnv. 701; Moore v. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 521
(1883) ; cf. State v. Hand, 87 Neb. 189, 126 N. W. 1002 (1910). Note (1912)
43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 355.
In some states there is a similar statute prohibiting remarriage by the
guilty party in divorce proceedings for adultery. Williams v. Oates, 27 N. C.
535 (1845); it re Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625, 39 Atl. 16 (1898); Gabisso's
Succession, 119 La. 704, 44 So. 438 (1907) ; Pennegar v. State, 87 Tenn. 244,
10 S. W. 305( 1889). Contra: State v. Shattuck, 69 Vt. 403, 38 Atl. 81 (1897);
(1924) 37 HARV. L. REv. 913.
'Dictum: Lanham v. Lanham, supra note 3. Note (1923) 8 IowA L. REv.
245. And see Soviet Marriages, (1929) 68 Law Journal 328.
"Wilson v. Cook, 256 Ill. 460, 100 N. E. 222 (1912) ; Heflinger v. Heflinger,
136 Va. 289, 118 S. E. 316 (1923). Note (1928) 41 HARV. L. Rav. 1059.
TWhippen v. Whippen, 171 Mass. 560, 51 N. E. 174 (1898).
'Mosholder v. Industrial Commission, 329 11. 497, 160 N.'E. 835 (1928);
Hall v. Industrial Commission, 165 Wis. 364, 162 N. W. 312 (1917) ; (1917)
27 YALE L. J. 131.
'Owen v. Owen, 178 Wis. 609, 190 N. W. 363 (1922).
"Mosholder v. Industrial Commission, supra note 8; Uniform Marriage
Evasion Act §2. Contra: People v. Goddard, 258 Pac. 447 (Cal. App. 1927),
criticised in (1928) 41 HARv. L. Rav. 397.
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Under statutes of the type" in the instant case a marriage
anywhere is specifically declared void, but if the parties conform
to the laws of the foreign jurisdiction the marriage is valid unless
they return to the original state. Even though the Wisconsin court
could not give any extraterritorial effect to the statute, the decision
is undoubtedly sound, since it is based on public policy and is sup-




OF COURT TO MAKE STATUTE CONSTITUTIONAL BY CHANGED CON-
STRUCTIoN-A Georgia statute creating a presumption of negligence
upon proof of injury resulting from the operation of cars of a rail-
way company was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
of the United States because, according to its construction by the
Georgia courts, it imposed not merely the duty of going forward
with the evidence but the greater burden of the risk of non-per-
suasion.1 After the above decision had been rendered, the Court
of Appeals of Georgia construed the same statute as imposing only
the duty of going forward with the evidence. 2 Thus, the decision of
the Georgia court, in putting a new construction on the statute after
it had been declared unconstitutional, raises the question whether a
state court can so change the construction of a statute held uncon-
stitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States as to cure
the objections to it.
The general rule that an unconstitutional statute is void ab initio-
that it never had the force and effect of law3-has been subjected to
I A different type of statute-to the effect that the divorce decree will not
take effect for six months-is found in Oklahoma. Such a statute simplifies
the whole situation, for a subsequent marriage within the time limit would be
bigamous and thus void everywhere. Atkeson v. Sovereign Camp, 90 Okla.
154, 216 Pac. 467, 32 A. L. R. 1108 (1923). It seems that a similar result
would be reached for a marriage that takes place pending a rule nisi in a
divorce suit. Commonwealth v. Stevens, 196 Mass. 280, 82 N. E. 33 (2)
(1907).
'Western and Atl. Ry. Co. v. Henderson, 279 U. S. 639, 49 Sup. Ct. 445
(1929). See also note (1929) 8 N. C. L. RFv. 50; note (1929) 43 HARv.
L. REv. 100.
2 Ga. Ry. & Power Co. v. Shaw, 149 S. E. 637, (Ga. 1929). Plaintiff was
standing near street car tracks on a public street in Atlanta placing things in
an automobile when he was injured by the defendant company's street car.
The ainion of the court contains an excellent discussion of presumptions.
SNorton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425, 30 L. ed. 128, 6 Sup. Ct. 1121
(1886) ; Louisiana v. Pillsbury, 105 U. S. 278, 26 L. ed. 1090 (1881) ; Ex parte
Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 25 L. ed. 717 (1879) ; Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610, 21
L. ed. 212 (1872) ; State v. Williams, 146 N. C. 618, 61 S. E. 61 (1908).
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an increasing number of limitations.4 In every jurisdiction, there
are cases which treat unconstitutional statutes as voidable rather
than void. For example, unconstitutional statutes creating moral
obligations on the state or individuals thereof, 5 creating public offices,"
subjecting officers to criminal liability for acting thereunder T have
been held void only from the date of their declared unconstitutionality.
Furthermore, there are some decisions which hold that an unconsti-
tutional statute is not void at all, but that the statute is merely inap-
plicable to the particular situation presented to the court.8
The precise question whether an inferior court, by changing the
construction of an unconstitutional statute, can render it constitu-
tional has apparently never been raised. Under the void ab initio
theory it would logically follow that since a statute ceases to exist
when it is declared unconstitutional, there is nothing left for any
court to consider. However, it has been held that a court can
reverse its own prior decision of unconstitutionality and that the
unconstitutional statute is thereby rendered effective as of the date of
its enactment.9 Therefore, in view of the trend away from the
ab initio theory, and since the construction of state statutes is
primarily the function of the state courts,' 0 a state court should
be allowed to change its construction so as to remove the objections
raised by the United States Supreme Court, provided (1) that such
a change would not be contrary to any manifest legislative intent,
and consequently (2) that the court would be justified in concluding,
"Field, Effect of Unconstitutional Statutes (1926), 1 IND. L. JouR. 1-4.
'Road Improvement Dist. No. B. v. Burkett, 163 Ark. 578, 260 S. W.
718 (1924).
'Nagel v. Bosworth, 198 Ky. 897, 147 S. W. 940 (1912) ; State v. Poulin,
104 Me. 224, 74 Atl. 119 (1909) ; Lang v. Mayor of Bayonee, 74 N. J. L. 455,
68 At. 90, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 94 (1907).
' State v. Godwin, 123 N. C. 697, 31 S. E. 221 (1898).
'Shephard v. Wheeling, 30 W. Va. 479, 4 S. E. 634 (1887); Allison v.
Corker, 67 N. J. L. 596, 52 Atl. 362 (1902) ; Bentley v. State Board Medical
Examiners, 152 Ga. 836, 111 S. E. 379 (1922).
'Christopher v. Mungen, 61 Fla. 513, 55 So. 273 (1911) ; State v. O'Neil,
147 Iowa 513, 126 N. W. 404 (1910); Pierce v. Pierce, 46 Ind. 86 (1874),
BLAcK, CONSTITUTIOMNAL LAW (3 ed. 1910) 75.
" It is assumed that the Supreme Court of Georgia would affirm the con-
struction of the statute given to it by the Georgia Court of Appeals. It has
been held that it is the duty of the federal courts to follow the construction
of a state constitution, in accordance with the decisions of the highest state
court on the subject, although, before such state decisions were rendered, the
federal courts had renered an opinion to the contrary. Sandford v.woe,
69 Fed. 546 (C. C., S. D., Ohio), 60 L. R. A. 641 (1895); Indianapolis v.
Navin, 151 Ind. 139, 47 N. E. 525, (1898); Fairfield v. Gallathi Co., 100
U. S. 47, 25 L. ed. 544 (1879).
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in view of the effect of its former decision-rendering the statute
unconstitutional-, that the new construction-rendering the statute
constitutional-must have been the one actually intended by the legis-
lature.11 Such a view, as expressed in the present decision, would
make unnecessary any new legislation. 12
J. FRAziER GLENN, JR.
EMPLOYER'S LIAiLITY-FEDERAL EmPLOyER'S LIABILITY AcT-
ADULTEROUS WIDOW AS BENEFICIARY-In Lytle v. Southern Ry.-
Carolina Division,' deceased was killed in North Carolina while en-
gaged in interstate commerce. Suit was brought under the Federal
Employer's Liability Act for the benefit of deceased's mother. There
were no children of deceased. Complaint alleged that deceased's wife
had deserted him and eloped with an adulterer. A demurrer to the
complaint was overruled. Judgment affirmed.
2
The Federal Employer's Liability Act specifies that the sum
recovered thereunder shall be "for the benefit of the surviving widow
or husband and children of such employee; and if none, then to such
employee's parents; and, if none, then to the next of kin dependent
-upon such employee. . . ."s The laws of the several state, in so far
as they cover the same field are superseded by this act.4 Therefore,
' A statute which is susceptible of two constructions, one of which would
render it unconstitutional and the other which would render it constitutional,
should be given the construction in favor of constitutionality. "It is the duty
of courts to adopt a construction that will bring (it) into harmony with
the constitution, if (its) language will permit, and they are not justified
in declaring an act of legislature invalid, if by any legitimate rules of con-
struction its meaning can be ascertained and its provisions carried out, even
though the construction which is adopted does not appear to be as natural
as the other." Stewart v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 65 Minn. 515, 68 N. W.
208, 33 L. R. A. 427 (1896) ; Samuelson v. State, 116 Tenn. 470, 95 S. W.
1012 (1906) ; Hooper v. State of California, 155 U. S. 648, 39 L. ed. 297, 15
Sup. Ct. 207, (1894).
' After the statute had been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
of the U. S. and before the decision in this case had been rendered, the legisla-
ture passed a new statute imposing the duty of merely proceeding with the
evidence, Ga. Pub. Laws (1929), ch. -; referred to in the principal case,
149 S. E. at p. 663.
1 149 S. E. 692 (S. C. 1929).
'Cothran, J., dissented. Leave was granted by the appellate court to allow
the defendant to make a motion to have the widow a party, and thereby pre-
vent a possibility of two judgments for the same tort.
'April 22, 1908, c. 149, §1, 35 Stat. 65, 45 U. S. C. A. §51.
4 Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 223 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 169, 56
L. ed. 327, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44 (1912), rev'g. 82 Conn. 373, 73 Atl. 762
(1909) ; Seaboard A. L. Ry. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, 34 Sup. Ct. 635, 58 L. ed.
1062 (1914), rev'g. 162 N. C. 424, 78 S. E. 494 (1913) ; Chesapeake & 0. R.
Co. v. Stapleton, 279 U. S. 587, 49 Sup. Ct. 442, 73 L. ed. 540 (1929).
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a recovery under the act can only be had by and for the persons or
classes of persons in whose favor the law creates a cause of action.5
If a beneficiary of the first class survives the deceased, the latter
mentioned classes are entirely excluded from benefit; and likewise,
if one person of the second class, but none of the first class, survives
the deceased, then the third class will be excluded. 6 A state statute7
determining the distributees of an intestate estate cannot effect the
beneficiaries under the Federal Act with respect to priority of claims.8
However, a state statute may be employed to secure the definition of
such a term as "next of kin."9 But the right of -the faithless wife
to recover under the Federal Act does not depend upon the existence
or non-existence under state laws of a right of dower or a right as
an heir of her deceased htisband.10
'In re Stone, 173 N. C. 208, 91 S. E. 852 (1917), writ of error dismissed
245 U. S. 638, 38 Sup. Ct. 192, 62 L. ed. 525 (1918).6Chicago, B. & Q. R. v. Wells-Dickey Trust Co., 275 U. S. 161, 48 Sup.
Ct. 73, 72 L. ed. 216 (1927), holding that where deceased was survived by his
mother, who died before suit, no recovery would be allowed to the dependent
sister.
'N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §2523, cuts off a faithless wife from dower
and prevents her from being an heir of her deceased husband.
a The state statutes are not applicable because they deal with the estate of
the deceased. The right of action in the personal representative, under the
Federal Act, for the benefit of designated beneficiaries, is not a part of the
estate of the deceased. It is a cause independent of any which the decedent
had; it includes no damages which he might have recovered; it is a liability
for pecuniary damage sustained by relatives of decedent. Mich. Cent. P. Co.
v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 33 Sup. Ct. 192, 57 L. ed 417 (1913).
'It is held in Seaboard A. L. R. Co. v. Kenney, 240 U. S. 489, 36 Sup. Ct.
458, 60 L. ed. 762 (1916), aff'g. 167 N. C. 14, 82 S. E. 968 (1914), that the
next of kin of an illegitimate are, according to the state law, the legitimate
children of the same mother, she having predeceased her illegitimate offspring,
and that in such a situation the asserted father may not claim as parent. It
is intimated in the case that the term "surviving widow," "husband," "children,"
and "mother" are understood as defined by the state law. But even under this
view it would seem that the marriage which created the husband-wife rela-
tionship is not dissolved by the unfaithful, criminal, or adulterous conduct of
one of the parties, but only by a divorce a vinculo. State statutes, other than
those regulating the distribution of an intestate's estate, establish the definition
of what is a wife and what is a widow. That the definition of "next of kin" is
found in the distribution statute is attributable to the fact that the term is
necessary only in that connection.
It seems paradoxical that a court in South Carolina, which will not grant
a divorce, should attempt to make a North Carolina statute of distributions
operate as a virtual decree of divorce.
"In Dunbar v. Charleston & W. C. R. Co., 186 Fed. 175, 176 (C. C. S. D.
Ga. 1911), the sustaining of an objection to an offer to prove that at the time
of death the wife was separated from her husband was affirmed, Speer, J.,
using the following words, but citing no authority: "The unhappy pair will be
presumed to live in the relationship of husband and wife until they have been
separated in a manner pointed out by law." A dictum which might possibly
point to a contrary result is to be found in New Orleans & Northeastern R.
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Moreover, her recovery is not based upon dependency." It rests
rather upon a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit from a
-continuance of his life.' 2 Exactly what "reasonable expectation" a
faithless and adulterous wife, who has irrevocably. lost all legal rights
to demand support, might prove is vague.'3 Nevertheless, her mere
existence, regardless of what she may or may not prove in the way
of pecuniary loss, operates to exclude the other classes.' 4
The instant case seems to have been incorrectly decided. The
allegation that deceased left a surviving widow should have sufficed
to allow the demurrer. But the case does very clearly evidence the
fact that there is a palpable defect in the Federal Act which allows
an unmeritorious person of a preferred class to recover the benefits,
or at least to exclude from benefits a deserving, though less pre-
ferred, class. 15  A. K. SmITH.
Co. v. Harris, 247 U. S. 367, 372, 38 Sup. Ct. 535, 536, 62 L. ed. 1167, 1171
(1918), and is as follows: "The deceased left a widow and although they had
lived apart no claim is made that the rights and liabilities consequent upon
marriage had disappeared under local law.... In the circumstances, proof
of the mother's pecuniary loss could not support a recovery." It is submitted
that the dictum found in Fogarthy v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 85 Wash. 90, 147
Pac. 652, 655 (1915), does not go to the question of whether this would
eliminate the wife in favor of the second class of beneficiaries: "It may be
conceded that had the undisputed evidence shown that the widow since being
abandoned by the deceased had led a dissolute life such as to absolve the hus-
band of all legal duty to support her, this would bar her recovery."
'The element of dependency is limited to the third class, the next of kin.
Moffett v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 220 Fed. 39 (C. C. A. 4th. W. Va. 1914);
Carolina C. & 0. Ry. v. Shewalter, 128 Tenn. 363, 161 S. W. 1136 (1913),
aff'd 239 U. S. 630, 36 Sup. Ct. 166, 60 L. ed. 476 (1915) ; Dooley v. Seaboard
A. L. R. Co., 163 N. C. 454, 79 S. E. 970 (1913).
' Mich. Cent. R. Co. v. Vreeland, supra note 7, which also clearly lays
down the rule that the widow may not recover for loss of consolation, com-
panionship or society.
" A discreditable argument in favor of the faithless wife might be made
in case the deceased lingered long enough for a cause of action on account of
loss and suffering to survive to his personal representative. April 5, 1910, c.
143, §2, 36 Stat. 391, 45 U. S. C. A. §59. A recovery in her behalf for the
personal loss and suffering of the deceased does not have to be based upon an
expectation of pecuniary benefit. A claim for such a recovery is usually joined
with a claim arising from the death. But since the claims are quite separate
and distinct (St. Louis etc. P. Co. v. Craft, 237 U. S. 648, 35 Sup. Ct. 704, 59
L. ed. 1160 (1915) ), it would seem that there might be a recovery on the
former, although a recovery on the latter was disallowed. The discreditable
part of the argument is based on the theory that a widow who could not other-
wise recover may do so if her husband lived for a short while after the injury
and suffered. Yet the same situation would result if a mother or father could
show no "expectation" or if the next of kin could show no dependency.
1 iSupra note 6. Of course, it might be argued that the phrase "if none"
should be judicially interpreted to mean "if none survived capable of showing
a pecuniary interest."
" This exclusion of a deserving class is quite as undesired as the wind-falls
to non-dependent next of kin under certain Workmen's Compensation Acts.
See (1929) 7 N. C. L. Rxv. 410.
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INSURANcE-ACIDENT INSURANcE-DEATH FROM WOOD ALCO-
HOL iN "BooT-LEG" LIQUoR-The deceased, who was insured against
loss of life "resulting from bodily injuries ... directly and inde-
pendently of all other causes, through accidental means," died as a
result of drinking wood alcohol which, unknown to him, was an
ingredient of synthetic gin cocktails served him by a friend. Held:
death resulted through accidental means.'
In accident insurance cases the distinction should be made be-
tween accidental injury or death and injury or death through acci-
dental means,2 for it is not the result but the means producing the
result that are insured against. Accidental means have been defined
as those which produce effects which are not their natural and
probable consequences.8 Thus, where the insured, though fully
aware of the deleterious nature of the fruit, voluntarily selected and
ate infected oranges, 4 and where the insured, with full knowledge
of the high fusel oil content of certain boot-leg whiskey, voluntarily
imbibed,5 the resultant deaths, though unquestionably accidental,
were not caused by accidental means, for in each case the insured
had consumed that which he intended to consume. But, on the other
hand, where the insured drank polluted water which he thought
pure,6 ate poisonous mush-rooms which he supposed edible,7 or
consumed food which he thought wholesome but which contained
ptomaines, s the deaths were held to have been caused by accidental
1Zurich Gen'l Acc. & Liability Co. v. Flickdnger, 33 F. (2d) 853 (C. C. A.
4th, 1929), Note (1929) 16 VA. L. REV. 64.
3 Rock v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 172 Cal. 462, 156 Pac. 1029, L. R. A. 1916 E,
1196, 1199 (1916); see Christian, The Accident Policy (1920) 7 VA. L. Rv.
116; Bagby, Recovery on Accident Policies Limiting Liability to Injuries or
Death Effected "Through External, Violent and Accidental Means" (1914) 2
ibid. 178.
'Western Com. Travelers' Ass'n v. Smith, 85 Fed. 401, 405, 40 L. R. A.
653 (C. C. A. 8th, 1898). If in the act which precedes the injury, something
unforeseen, unexpected, unusual occurs, which produces the injury, then the
injury has resulted through accidental means, U. S. Mutual Acc. Ass'n v.
Barry, 131 U. S. 100, 9 Sup. Ct. 755, 33 L. ed. 60 (1888). For a discussion
of "accident" and "accidental" see, (1910) 24 HARV. L. Rxv. 221; (1914) 28
ibid. 209.
'Martin v. Interstate etc. Acc. Ass'n, 187 Iowa 869, 174 N. W. 577 (1919)
(1920) 18 Mic. L. REv. 429.
'Calkins v. Nat. Travelers' Ass'n, 200 Iowa 60, 204 N. W. 406 (1925), 41
A. L. R. 363 (1926).
'Christ v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 312 Ill. 525, 144 N. E. 161, 35 A. L. R.
730 (1924).
1U. S. Casualty Co. v. Griffis, 186 Ind. 126, 114 N. E. 83 (1916), L, R. A.
1917F, 481.
"Johnson v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 184 Mich. 406, 151 N. W. 593 (1915)
(tainted food); Newsoms v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 147 Va. 471, 137
S. E. 456 52 A. L. R. 363 (1927). commented on (1928) 31 LAW NoTas 212
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means. Likewise, where the deceased, intending to take a small
dose of a dangerous medicine, by mistake took a lethal dose,9 inad-
vertently took the wrong draft,10 or swallowed what ordinarily is a
harmless substance in such a manner as to produce death," the courts
have generally found that death resulted through accidental means.
The situation presented by the principal case meets all the require-
ments for death by accidental means; whatever may be the "natural
and probable" consequences of drinking gin cocktails, death is not
generally considered as such. The unforeseen, unexpected and un-
usual thing' 2 which produced the death was the presence, unknown
to the insured, of wood alcohol in the beverage.
THOmAS W. SPRiNxLE.
QUASI CONTRACTs-LIABILITY OF MUNIcIPALITY FOR BENEFITS
CONFERRED UNDER ILLEGAL CONTRAT-Plaintiff municipality con-
tracted with defendant property owners to exempt them from taxes
for a period of ten years in consideration of their subdividing and
developing their property. The contract was repugnant to a con-
stitutional provision making void contracts for tax exemption, and to
a statute making void contracts in which councilmen were interested.
Plaintiff sued for taxes; defendants counterclaimed in quantum
meruit for sums expended in the development. Held: plaintiff
(pork and beans); O'Connor v. Columbian Nat Life Ins. Co., 208 Mo. App.
46, 232 S. W. 218 (1921) (decomposed ice cream) ; Buel v. Kansas City Life
Ins. Co., 250 Pac. 635 (N. M. 1926), 52 A. L. R. 366 (milk from cow which
had eaten golden-rod-alkali poisoning resulted) ; Md. Casualty Co. v. Hudgen,
97 Tex. 124, 76 S. W. 745, 104 Am. St. Rep. 857 (1903) (spoiled oysters-
recovery in this case was barred by an exception in the policy) ; Sutter v.
Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 215 Ill. App. 341 (1919).
0 Pixley v. Ill. Com. Men's Assn, 195 Ill. App. 135 (1915) (overdose of
morphine); Dezell v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 126 Mo. 253, 75 S. W. 1102
(1903) (morphine) ; Hodgson v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 165 N. Y. Supp. 293,
100 Misc. Rep. 155 (1917) (morphine); Mutual Acc. Ass'n v. Tuggle, 39 Ill.
App. 509 (1891) (overdose of laudanum). But see, Carnes v. Iowa etc. Ass'n,
106 Iowa 281, 76 N. W. 683, 68 Am. St. Rep. 306 (1898).
4 Healey v. Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 133 Ill. 556, 25 N. E. 52, 23 Am. St. Rep.
637, 9 L. R. A. 371 (1890) ; Metropolitan Acc. Ins. Ass'n v. Froiland, 161 Ill.
30, 43 N. E. 766 (1896) (chloral instead of distilled water) ; Travelers' Ins.
Co. v. Dunlap, 59 Ill. App. 515, 160, I1. 642, 43 N. E. 765 (1896) (accidental
taking of carbolic acid). But see Miller v. Ft. Wayne Mercantile Acc. Ass'n,
153 N. E. 427 (Ind. App. 1926), commented on (1926)- 12 ST. L. L. kay. 146;
(1926) 13 VA. L. Rav. 238; (1926) 25 Micr. L. RLy. 309.
' American Acc. Co. v. Reigert, 94 Ky. 547, 23 S. W. 191, 42 Am. St. Rep.
374, 21 L. R. A. 651 (1893) (suffocation caused by piece of beefsteak lodging
in windpipe); Gohlke v. Hawkeye Com. Men's Ass'n, 198 Iowa 144, 197 N. W.
1004, 35 A. L. R. 1177 (1924) (strangulation produced by effervescence of sal
hepatica swallowed dry).
"U. S. Mut. Acc. Ass'n v. Barry, supra note 3.
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recovers taxes, and defendants take nothing by their counterclaim.1
Generally the value of benefits conferred by one who is party
to an illegal contract may not be recovered in quasi contract.2 An
exception exists in the case of a private corporation, where the ille-
gality consists solely in the fact that the contract is ultra vires.
3
But this exception does not apply to municipal corporations, because
of a supposed policy that taxpayers should be relieved from the
consequences of official misconduct.4 This view, while well established,
is open to the counter suggestion that to permit recovery might
awaken the voters to their duty to select responsible officers.5 And
recovery has been allowed where it would not burden the taxpayers,6
or where the statute contravened by the contract is so formal that
its violation is without substantial effect. 7  The instant case is
clearly correct, in that the prohibitions against the contract were
not of the latter class.8 It would seem, however, to be of no moment
whether the contract is ultra vires or irregular. That distinction
is unnecessarily emphasized in the opinion.
However, the instant case seems to present a more fundamental
reason for denying recovery on the count in quantum meruit. Pri-
vate owners develop their property patently for their own gain.
No benefit is conferred on the municipality, distinguishable from that
incidentally and inevitably accruing from the normal carrying out
of any constructive private enterprise. It is not, therefore, inequitable
for the city to retain such a benefit.' 0
J. H. CHADBOURN.
'City of Bristol v. Dominion National Bank, 149 S. E. 632 (Va. 1929).
'Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 141 N. C. 60, 53 S. E. 652, 4 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 589 (1906). As to recovery where the contract is within the Statute
of Frauds, see Carter v. Carter, 182 N. C. 186, 108 S. E. 765, 17 A. L. L 945
(1921).
'Howard & Foster Co. v. Citizens National Bank of Union, 133 S. C. 202,
130 S. E. 758 (1925) ; WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRAcTs (1913) §160.
,'Thomas v. City of Richmond, 79 U. S. 349, 20 L. ed. 453 (1870) ; Litch-
field v. Ballou, 114 U. S. 190, 5 S. Ct. 820, 29 L. ed. 132 (1884); Burgin v.
Smith, 151 N. C. 561, 66 S. E. 607 (1909); Note (1904) 4 COL. L. REv. 67.
'Knowlton, Quasi Contracts of AMunicipalities, (1911) 9 MICH. L. Rav.
671-681.
'Butts County v. Jackson Banking Co., 129 Ga. 801, 60 S. E. 149 (1908).
'Webb v. Wakefield Township, 239 Mich. 521, 215 N. W. 43 (1927), com-
mented on in (1928) 26 Micn. L. Rv. 335; Laird Norton Yards v. Rochester,
117 Minn. 114, 134 N. W. 644, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 473 (1912).
'Cawker v. Central Bitulithic Paving Co., 140 Wis. 25, 121 N. W. 888
(1909), (competitive bidding). Beebe v. Sullivan County, 64 Hun. 377, 19
N. Y. Supp. 629 (1892), (interest of councilman).
'3 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2nd ed. 1928) §1274; (1922) 31
YALE L. J. 779.
"WOODWARD, op. cit. smtpra note 3, 7.
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REAL PROPERTY-PARTITION SALE AS JUDICIAL SALE NOT EXE-
CUTION SALE-TITLE AcQuIRED BY PURCHASER-In Perry V. Wig-
gins' a purchaser at a duly decreed partition sale discovered that
the title was defective after the sale and before the court con-
firmed it. The deed purported to convey a fee-simple. The com-
missioners retained the purchase money, awaiting the confirma-
tion. Summons had not been served on four parties who owned
an interest in the land, one of whom filed a petition that her interest
be not sold. The court affirmed a decision that the parties be restored
to their original status quo.
A judicial sale is one made, under the process of a court having
jurisdiction to order it, by an officer appointed and commissioned to
sell. In an execution sale the contract is between the parties. In
common law jurisdictions the purchaser acquires only such interest
as the judgment debtor possessed,2 taking merely a quit-claim of the
execution debtor's title,2 without warranty, 4 so that if the judgment
debtor had nothing, the purchaser acquires nothing.5 North Caro-
lina provides that the purchaser may sue the defendant who has no
title for the amount paid, but not the sheriff or plaintiff in execution.6
On the other hand, in judicial sales, the court has entire control over
the contract. It considers the contract as made with itself, or by the
parties under the direction of the court, and will interfere, under
equitable circumstances, to relieve the purchaser where it would not
in a private contract.7
It has been broadly stated that the purchaser at a partition sale
buys.at his own peril, s and certainly acquires only such title as was
in the parties to the partition proceeding.9 However, the doctrine
of caveat emptor has been somewhat relaxed with regard to judicial
sales. 10 The purchaser has only the duty to examine the record of
the proceedings and to ascertain that the officer has authority to
1197 N. C. 502, 149 S. E. 729 (1929).
'Frost v. Yonkers Bank, 70 N. Y. 553, 26 Am. Rep. 627 (1877) ; Boggs v.
Fowler, 16 Cal. 559, 76 Am. Dec. 561 (1860).
'Gonce v. McCoy, 101 Tenn. 587, 49 S. W. 754 (1898).
'Davis v. Murray, 2 Mill Const. (S. C.) 143, 12 Am. Dec. 661 (1818).
'Sanborn v. Kittredge, 20 Vt. 632, 50 Am. Dec. 58 (1847).
'N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §685.
'The Monte Allegre, 9 Wheat. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 213, 6 L. ed. 174 (1824);
Smith v. Brittain, 38 N. C. 347, 42 Am. Dec. 175 (1844).
'Holt v. Love, 63 Tex. Civ. App. 65, 131 S. W. 857 (1910), 33 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 409.
Ruf. v. Mueller, 49 Ind. 7, 96 N. E. 612 (1911).l' Eccles v. Timmons, 95 N. C. 540 (1886).
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sell. 1 The purchaser is bound to take such title as an examination of
the proceedings show that he will get.12 But where the pleadings
and the proceedings purport to sell a perfect title, he will not be
required to take the land, if the title is imperfect.' 3 The purchaser
is entitled to be relieved from his purchase if he was not fairly
apprised of defects in the title.
1"
The interests of parties not represented in the partition pro-
ceedings are not affected by a judicial sale and they become tenants
in common with the purchaser in the land.1 Such a defect of
parties will entitle the purchaser to recover the sum he has paid. 16
If the proceedings purport to offer a fee-simple, the buyer will not
be compelled to complete the purchase, unless a title which is good
both in law and equity can be given.17 Nor is he bound if the title
be doubtful, exposing him to the hazard of litigation with parties
not before the court.' s It has been held that the purchaser is entitled
to a marketable title and should not be forced to take any other.19
In England and Canada the courts undertake to sell a good title.
The custom is to allow the purchaser a reasonable time within which
to examine the title and if it is defective, he may be released from
his bid.
20
The instant case is well substantiated in this jurisdiction.2 '
C. E. REITZEL.
TAXATION-INCOME TAX-PAYMENT OF TAX ON SALARY BY
EMPLOYER AS INCOME TO EMPLOYEE-In Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue' the American Woolen Co. paid
in 1919 and 1920 the income taxes of its officers, pursuant to a reso-
lution passed in 1916 "to the end that said persons and officers shall
1 Buell v. Kanamba Lumber Corp., 185 Fed. 109 (C. C. A. 4th 1911).
" Podesta v. Binns, 69 N. J. Eq. 387, 60 AtI. 815 (1905).
"Eccles v. Timmons, supra note 10.
"' Remsen v. Storm, 157 N. Y. 705, 52 N. E. 1124 (1898).
'Bowler v. Ennis, 46 App. Div. 309, 61 N. Y. S. 686 (1899).
"Handy v. Waxter, 75 Md. 517, 23 AtI. 1035 (1892); In re Callahan, 176
App. Div. 906, 162 N. Y. S. 1113 (1917).
11 Morris v. Mowatt, 2 Paige 586, 22 Am. Dec. 661 (N. Y. 1831).U McCaffrey v. Little, 20 Ct. of App. D. C. 116 (1902).
"Wonser v. De Nyse, 188 N. Y. 378, 80 N. E. 1088 (1907) ; Crowley v.
O'Neil, 271 Fed. 379 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1921).
'Freeland v. Pearson, L. R. 7 Eq. 246 (1867) ; Else v. Else, L. R. 13 Eq.
196 (1868) ; Street v. Hallet, 6 Ont. Pr. 312 (1871).
'Eccles v. Timmons, supra note 10; Carraway v. Stancill, 137 N. C. 472,
49 S. E. 957 (1905) ; Edney v. Edney, 80 N. C. 81 (1879) ; Shields v. Allen,
77 N. C. 375 (1877).
1279 U. S. 716, 49 Sup. Ct. 499, 73 L. ed. 918 (1929).
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
receive their salaries or other compensation in full without deduction
on account of income taxes." It was contended by the Commissioner
that such payment was to the officers additional income on which
additional taxes were due under the Revenue Act of 1918.2 The Board
of Tax Appeals sustained this contention, and the Supreme Court, on
certificate from the Circuit Court of Appeals,3 affirmed the decision.
"Income" has been defined in all of the Revenue Acts to include
"gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever,"4
and by the courts it has uniformly been given its common, ordinary
meaning, and not a technical one.5 The Revenue Acts contemplate
receipt of income by the taxpayer within the taxable period,6 with
the qualification that it may be constructively as well as actually
received. 7 The payment, for a consideration, by one person to a
third party of the obligation of the person taxed is generally con-
sidered as income to the latter, the typical situation being the pay-
ment by a lessee of interest to the bondholders or of dividends to
the stockholders of a lessor.8 In the case of bonds containing tax-
free covenants9 the tax levied at the source and paid by the covenantor
is held not to constitute additional income to the obligee ;1O however,
240 Stat. 1058 (1918). At the present time incomes are taxed under the
Revenue Act of 1928 (45 Stat. 795).
'33 F. (2d) 889 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928).
'Revenue Act of 1918, supra note 2, §213 (a) ; Revenue Act of 1928, supra
note 2, §22 (a) ; see BARToN AND BROWNING, FEm.AL INCOmE AND ESTATE
TAX LAWS (4th ed. 1929) 28, 30, 31.
Merchant's Loan and Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U. S. 509, 41 Sup. Ct.
386, 65 L. ed. 751 (1921); Gavit v. Irwin, 275 Fed. 643, 645 (N. D. N. Y.
1921).
• Revenue Act of 1918, supra note 2, §213 (a) (2) ; Revenue Act of 1928,
supra note 2, §42; Regulations 74, Art. 331.
'HOLmES, FEDERAL TAXES (6th ed. 1925) §263.
'U. S. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 19 F. (2d) 157 (S. D. N. Y. 1926) -
Rensselaer & S. R. Co. v. Irwin, 249 Fed. 726 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918) ; West End
St. Ry. Co. v. Malley, 246 Fed. 625 (C. C. A. 1st, 1917); Blalock v. Georgia
Ry. & Electric Co., 246 Fed. 387 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917).
'"In any case where bonds, mortgages, or deeds of trust, or other similar
obligations of a corporation contain a contract or provision by which the
obligor agrees to pay any portion of the tax imposed by this title upon the
obligee, or to pay the interest without deduction for any tax which the obligor
may be required or permitted to pay thereon or to retain therefrom under any
law of the United States, the obligor shall deduct and withhold a tax equal
to two per cent of the interest upon such . obligations." Revenue Act of
1918, supra note 2, §221 (b).
"Duffy v. Pitney, 2 F. (2d) 230 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924) ; Heller v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 10 B. T. A. 53 (1928). Contra: Massey v. Led-
erer, 277 Fed. 123 (E. D. Penn. 1921). The view of Duffy v. Pitney, supra,
was adopted in the Revenue Act of 1921 (42 Stat. 227), §234 (a) (3), and it
has remained unchanged in the subsequent Acts; see BARTON AND BROWNING,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 56 and 57.
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this holding does not conflict with the general rule above. The tax
upon this type of bond is imposed by law upon the covenantor, while
in the normal case it results from the contract of the parties and its
payment is in the nature of compensation for the use of property.
The Supreme Court in the companion-case to the one under discus-
sion held payment by a lessee, under the terms of a lease, of income
taxes assessed against the lessor to be additional taxable income to
the lessor.11 Payment of taxes cannot be distinguished from the
discharge by the lessee of other of the lessor's obligations. 12 Simi-
larly, with the payment, pursuant to an agreement, by the employer
of income taxes assessed against its employees.
The value of property acquired by gift.is exempt from income
tax,'3 but the payment of money to or for another, when made for
services rendered or other valuable consideration, is not a gift.' 4
The rendition of services constituted the consideration in the present
case.
The effect of the possibility that the payment by the employer of
the additional tax would create more income on which more tax
would be due, and so on ad infinitum, has never been decided by
' U. S. v. Boston & M. R. R. 279 U. S. 732, 49 Sup. Ct. 505, 73 L. ed. 929
(1929). Accord: Old Colony R. R. Co. v. Commissioner, B. T. A. Docket No.
18813, Nov. 19, 1929.
"' In all such cases the payment is made as a part of the compensation for
the use of property and, although it does not pass through the lessor's hands,
is made for his benefit. This is as truly a part of the income from the prop-
erty as would be a payment of an equal amount made directly to the lessor.
Appeal of Providence & Worcester R. R. Co., 5 B. T. A. 1186 (1927). Contra:
Boston & M. R. R. v. U. S., 23 F. (2d) 343 (D. C. Mass. 1927), (1928) 41
HARV. L. REV. 801 (overruled by U. S. v. Boston & M. R. R., supra note 11),
where the court, while admitting that such payment was income to the lessor,
denied that this was taxable to him on the ground that he derived no gain
therefrom.
"Revenue Act of 1918, supra note 2, §213 (b) (3) ; Revenue Act of 1928,
supra note 2, §22 (b) (3) ; U. S. v. Merriam, 263 U. S. 179, 44 Sup. Ct. 69. 68
L. ed. 240, 29 A. L. R. 1547 (1923) ; see John M. Maguire, Capitali.-ation of
Periodical Payments by Gift (1920) 34 HARv. L. REV. 20; Roswell Magill, In-
come Tax Liability of Annuities (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 229.
"4Noel v. Parrott, 15 F. (2d) 669 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926), holding as taxable
income an amount paid to a general superintendent and director of a corpor-
atfon under a resolution of the directors. Jones v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 31 F. (2d) 755 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929), is a similar case, in which the
decision that the payment by the corporation to certain members of its admin-
istrative staff constituted a gift was distinguished from the Noel case, mipra,
on the ground that payment was not out of the assets of the corporation but
was a result of the sale of stock, and consequently was out of the assets of the
stockholders.
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the courts.15 The diffichlty of computation would not make such a
result fatal to the tax,16 however, and, since it would seem to be
a natural consequence of the contract of the parties, the latter should
not be heard to complain. 17
CHARLES F. RousE.
"1It has been suggested that this point will not arise for determination, be-
cause of the Commissioner's practice of considering as income only the tax
assessed on the employee's original return. U. S. v. Norwich & W. R. Co., 16
F. (2d) 944 (D. C. Mass. 1926).
' Boston & M. R. R v. U. S., supra note 12.
"TAppeal of Providence & Worcester R. R. Co., supra note 12.
